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Abstract
On 9th April 2008 at 2:14 p.m., on the highway between
Lausanne and Vevey in western Switzerland, there was
a 72-car pileup including five trucks that caused one
death and injured 26 others. The relatively light toll was
attributed to reduced vehicular speeds on account of
foggy weather, together with the quick actions and
effectiveness of the first responders and the excellent
collaboration between the various rescue groups
(medical rescue services, fire and police departments).
For the first time, we used an innovative on-site medical
command and control system, based on a binomial
team. Two hours after the accident, the last of the in-
jured had been evacuated and first aid on the site had
ended. This article describes how the Emergency Med-
ical Services from the State of Vaud, Switzerland, han-
dled the situation and how the binomial team is
structured.
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Introduction
The highway between Lausanne and Vevey travels
along the Lake of Geneva at an altitude of 600 m. It
was built in the early 1970s and is a two-lane highway,
including an emergency lane in each direction. Traffic
is typically heavy, with an average of more than 60,000
cars per day. This region is often in a dense fog. A
similar accident on the same stretch of highway took
place on 20th February 1999 and involved 45 vehicles.
The section of the highway where the accident oc-
curred is mainly composed of viaducts and is, there-
fore, inaccessible using the shoulder of the road. Both
helicopter landings as well as the set up of an advanced
medical post can only be done directly on the road.
Due to the topography of the area, ambulances have to
access the accident site going both in the direction of
traffic, as well as against traffic. The contra lateral road
can also be used to gain access to the site. That was the
case on this occasion (Figure 1).
On 9th April at 2:15 p.m., the Emergency Medical
Services (144) was alerted by the police after the latter
had received a call from an eyewitness. The informa-
tion was immediately confirmed by a second witness,
an ambulance driver who was in the accident, and who
called 144 on his cell phone. There was a dense fog, the
temperature was approximately 10C, there was a light
wind, and it was raining. Visibility was approximately
25 m. The accident site stretched over an area of 200 m
and was comprised of a tangle of cars and trucks
(Figure 2). Reduced vehicular speed no doubt kept the
injuries light, but slow speed was also (together with
poor visibility) the principal cause of the accident.
Drivers who were surprised when they came upon
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slow-moving traffic in the fog caused the first cars to
collide, and this was followed by a multi-car pileup.
Materials and Methods
We retrospectively collected all of the data concerning
the number of victims treated at the site and at the
involved hospitals, as well as the logistics and dedi-
cated structures, reported by the Emergency Medicals
Services, the Health Authority of the State, and the
police and fire departments.
In the State of Vaud (670,00 inhabitants), emer-
gency medical resources are coordinated by the 144
call center. The police and fire departments each have
their own dispatch center. The 144 dispatchers are ei-
ther trained paramedics or nurses. The 144 call center
consists of the logistic head of all medical rescue
operations in the entire state, regardless of the type.
Since 2008, the medical command and control
system for rescue operations on site is based on a
binomial setup comprised of one head rescue doctor
and one head rescue paramedic, both trained for
disaster medicine (Figure 3). This team can be mobi-
lized 24/7 for any major event and is responsible for
coordinating the rescue efforts at the site of the
catastrophe. In principle, this team is mobilized as soon
as the number of patients exceeds ten or if an accident
requires more than five rescue teams (ambulances,
helicopters, medical response teams1).
The 144 center can dispatch about 20 ambulances
and eight medical response teams throughout the
entire state, in addition to one medical helicopter
based in Lausanne. In case of a disaster, an advanced
medical post (Figure 4) can also be deployed. This
structure is staffed with paramedics and doctors who
are responsible for attending victims awaiting evacua-
tion. Finally, if necessary, 144 can also ask for re-
sources from other states (ambulances, medical
response teams, and helicopters).
Results
Emergency Medical Services Response to the
Accident
At 2:15 p.m., the 144 center was alerted of a major
accident on the highway and immediately dispatched
three ambulances and the medical command and con-
trol team. At 2:21 p.m., the medical response teams
from Lausanne and Vevey were dispatched, as well as
the advanced medical post (AMP).
At 2:51 p.m., according to the Swiss prehospital
strategy, an initial assessment (pretriage) by the first
paramedics on the scene reported one death and 20
injured (including four severe), many of them being
trapped in their cars. In total, 16 ambulances, two
medical response teams, the helicopter crew, the AMP,
Figure 2. A tangle of cars and trucks.
Figure 3. The on-site medical command and control system.
Figure 1. Use of the contra lateral road to gain access to the site.
1 Those teams are composed of one emergency doctor and one
paramedic. They are complementary to the ambulance when a sit-
uation needs medical support. Their vehicle does not allow the
transportation of patients.
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and the medical command and control team were dis-
patched by the 144 center (Table 1). On this occasion,
144 also dispatched the mobile EMS command post
(Figures 5 and 6), equipped with all communication
devices (radios, mobile phone, computers) and staffed
with a 144 dispatcher, allowing medical regulation di-
rectly from the site. Unfavorable weather conditions
prevented the use of the helicopter and aerial recon-
naissance of the site. Nevertheless, the helicopter team
(one physician and one paramedic) was dispatched by
land to participate in the on-site triage.
Hospitals Response to the Accident
The state of Vaud has one university hospital which
functions as a level 1 trauma center and seven regional
hospitals. In accordance with present procedures, the
regional hospitals closest to the accident were notified of
the event by 144 and were asked to receive the injured.
Inventories of available beds among all emergency
rooms, intensive care units, and burn centers were taken
(Table 2). At 3:25 p.m., or 70 min after the accident was
first reported, 144 was able to inform the medical com-
mand and control team of the bed availability at the
hospitals closest to the accident site in order to optimize
care dispatching of the victims. At the sound of the first
Table 1. Pre-hospital medical resources alerted.
Units Size and type Distance (km)
from the scene
Ambulances
Ambulance 1 2 paramedics 9
Ambulance 2 2 paramedics 9
Ambulance 3 2 paramedics 9
Ambulance 4 2 paramedics 8
Ambulance 5 2 paramedics 8
Ambulance 6 2 paramedics 9
Ambulance 7 2 paramedics 36
Ambulance 8 2 paramedics 8
Ambulance 9 2 paramedics 9
Ambulance 10 2 paramedics 8
Ambulance 11 2 paramedics 24
Ambulance 12 2 paramedics 9
Ambulance 13 2 paramedics 8
Ambulance 14 2 paramedics 43
Ambulance 15 2 paramedics 52
Ambulance 16 2 paramedics 9
Ambulance 17 2 paramedics 34
Ambulance 18 2 paramedics 8
Mobile EMS
command post
1 dispatcher, 1 paramedic 9
Helicopter REGA 1 pilot, 1 paramedic, 1 doctor 8
Medical response
team 1
1 paramedic, 2 doctors 9
Medical response
team 2
1 paramedic, 2 doctors 9
Medical command
and control team
1 paramedic, 1 doctor 9
Advanced medical
post
2 tents, 25 (nurses/paramedics) 9
Total 74 health care professionals
Figure 4. The advanced medical post. Figure 5. Mobile EMS command post.
Figure 6. Mobile EMS command post.
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alarm, many hospitals freed up their emergency rooms
by moving patients to the floors, halted elective surgeries
by finishing ongoing operations and retained personnel
who had ended their regular shifts.
Patients were transported to five different hospi-
tals. The regional hospitals received those with the
least severe injuries. The university hospital (CHUV)
was, at first, reserved for victims with the most severe
injuries. As there were no cases of major multiple
trauma, the CHUV finally received a total of 12 pa-
tients with moderate injuries, and in two waves. No
secondary transfers were done from the regional hos-
pitals, which attests that the on-site triage was entirely
appropriate. None of the hospitals receiving accident
victims showed signs of patient overload or any
technical dysfunction related to the influx of the in-
jured. The homogeneous distribution of patients
amongst the five hospitals probably contributed to this
(Table 3).
Central Coordination and Command on the Site
The activities at the accident site were organized around a
tripartite system, reuniting the medical command and
control team and the police and fire departments (Fig-
ure 7). Coordinated reports every 30 min assured a reg-
ular exchange of information. The medical command and
control team was backed up by the mobile EMS command
post. The coordination of emergency rescue services,
therefore, operated flawlessly at the state level. The 144
center was essential as back-up support with the on-site
command post. This was possible thanks to the recruit-
ment of three additional 144 dispatchers to supplement
the two already on duty that day. Besides this, it also kept
the centers’ ability to manage both the emergency as well
as all normal daily operations for the whole state.
Communication Systems
The on-site communication between the various health
care professionals was assured mainly by radio on a
Table 2. Hospital resources available.
Hospital Distance from
the accident (km)
Total beds
available
ICU beds
available
Trauma
center
(yes/no)
Burn
center
(yes/no)
Disaster plan
activated
(yes/no)
CHUV (trauma center) 8 28 3 Yes Yes Yes
Paediatric Hospital Lausanne 12 10 0 No No No
Morges 24 15 1 No No No
Montreux 24 4 1 No No No
St-Loup 28 4 2 No No No
Vevey (paediatrics) 20 4 0 No No No
Payerne 41 Not alerted Not alerted No No No
Yverdon 41 Not alerted Not alerted No No No
Nyon 52 Not alerted Not alerted No No No
Table 3. Hospital load.
Hospital Out-
patients
In-patients
ward
In-patients
ICU
Surgery
CHUV (trauma center) 10 2 0 2
Paediatric hospital
Lausanne
2 0 0 0
Morges 5 1 0 0
Montreux 2 3 0 0
St-Loup 1 0 0 0
Vevey (paediatrics) 0 0 0 0
Payerne 0 0 0 0
Yverdon 0 0 0 0
Nyon 0 0 0 0
Total 20 6 0 2 Figure 7. The tripartite system, reuniting the medical command and
control team and the police and fire departments.
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dedicated channel for ambulances and medical per-
sonnel. The police and firemen had their own separate,
dedicated channel. Because of the large number of
action plans implemented, radio communication
channels were quickly saturated, thus, limiting the
effectiveness of those communications. Cell phone
networks were only briefly saturated and served, in
many instances, as subsidiary modes of communica-
tion. ‘Dispatch riders’ were used sporadically to
transmit information, in particular between the acci-
dent site and the on-site command post.
Total Number and Severity of Injuries
With the exception of one victim who died at the scene,
the 27 other victims suffered only minor injuries. The
initial pretriage conducted by the first team of para-
medics on the scene reported one death and 20 injured,
including four serious. This first report overestimated
the severity of injuries and slightly underestimated the
number of injured. This anomaly is explained by a
relatively high number of victims trapped in the cars,
but who were, in the end, free from traumatic injuries.
All injuries were due to direct physical trauma. The
presence in the pileup of a natural gas vehicle was
discovered later.
All 47 people involved but uninjured were medi-
cally evaluated on the site and rapidly evacuated by
bus to the state central police station 9 km away. A
second clinical examination was organized in the local
police stations by a medical team, which brought to
light six additional victims requiring medical attention
for minor trauma. A team of five mental health pro-
fessionals offered, if desired, psychological support at
the state police station where the unharmed were
transported. The media assisted indirectly with the
resiliency of the operation by focusing on the positive
reactions of those involved who spontaneously offered
help and their vehicle as shelter for the injured. The
last of the injured were evacuated at 4:35 p.m. or
140 min following the accident.
Discussion
The 144 center reacted rapidly and dispatched the first
responders in a timely manner. An inventory of
available beds at regional hospitals was done rapidly
and there were a sufficient number of ambulances on
site. Pre-triage was highly effective, with an initial
assessment 15 min following the accident, which
turned out to be close to the final assessment. There
was no need to provide any urgent care (intubations,
thoracic drainages), which allowed for the majority of
patients to be evacuated without having to be treated
at the site. The low ISS scores of patients (all below
15), in addition to the quick arrival of many transport
vehicles, allowed for the quick evacuation of patients,
without the need for a true triage.
The medical command and control binomial team
functioned extremely well. The specific skills of one
physician and one paramedic both trained in the man-
agement of this type of disaster proved to complement
one another perfectly and were, thus, indispensable to
the task at hand. The presence of the mobile EMS
command post with a dispatcher was of great help for
the medical binomial team, relieving both the head
paramedic and head doctor of time-consuming com-
munications with different partners.
Excellent collaboration existed between the vari-
ous partners (police, firemen, and health care profes-
sionals) on site with frequent coordination meetings.
The communications and the flow of information to
and from the hospitals were the area which proved to be
the most unsatisfactory during the management of this
major accident. It is necessary to have a dedicated mode
of communication for the hospitals so that they can
remain regularly informed about the evolving situation
at the scene of the accident. Some hospitals far from the
scene did not receive any information from the 144
center because it was assumed that they would not be
receiving any of the victims. On the other hand, those
hospitals that were notified would have liked to receive
additional information about the accident.
Finally, the quality of the radio messages showed
that many of the health care professionals involved
lacked proper training in the use of this mode of
communication.
Conclusion
In all, over 170 rescuers (police, firemen, and health
care professionals) were dispatched to the site.
It is important to highlight that, with such a large
number of vehicles involved, the toll could have been
much greater. Chance does not stop there: if the
accident had happened outside of working hours, it
would not have been possible to get as many rein-
forcements and in such a timely manner for the 144
center, nor as many ambulances or physicians on the
ground.
It is also of note that, because of difficulties in
accessing the accident site and due to the rapid
deployment of the emergency crews, the rescue efforts
were not hindered by idle onlookers, families, or by the
press. The topography also allowed for maintaining
Dami F, et al. Coordination of Emergency Medical Services for a Major Road Traffic Accident
Eur J Trauma Emerg Surg 2009 Æ No. 3  URBAN & VOGEL 269
control over the group of victims. In fact, no victim
could have left the site on his/her own, and none
admitted himself/herself directly to a hospital. This
allowed for an optimal use of the local hospitals and
avoided an influx of spontaneous consultations.
The excellent evolution of the rescue operation at
this accident site demonstrates the importance of
teaching the basic elements of disaster medicine to all
rescue personnel, as well as regular training in com-
mand and control strategies. This assures that all rescue
teams speak the same language and that the leaders of
the rescue missions have the tools available needed to
‘organize the chaos.’
Simulations at the 144 center, practical exercises on
the ground or in the hospitals, in addition to medical
training for disasters, lie, without a doubt, behind the
success of this rescue operation.
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